Th e 140 essays in the present publication could have been arranged alphabetically into one enormous electronic fi le, but for the sake of libraries and also readers not interested in all regions of the planet, it has been divided into fi ve volumes. It was decided at O.P.O. II to replace the obsolete division between Eastern and Western Europe with one between the Northern European and the Euro-Mediterranean regions. Whether this is more than an editorial convenience must remain to be seen, although the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean regional phenomenological organization was also supported there and has since taken place. Divisions into regions may change for the O.P.O. in the future and this division should not be taken to signify that there are not already extensive and increasing communication and cooperation between groups and individuals from diff erent regions or that phenomenologists have not been refl ecting on diff erences and relations between civilizations, societies, ethnicities, and other cultural groups for some time.
Th e Executive Committee of the O.P.O. has provided two editors for each of fi ve geographic regions of the planet. Th e laborious process of judging essays has been avoided by welcoming two essays decided upon by each participating formal member organization of the O.P.O., which fi ts the "bottom-up" character of this umbrella organization.
What the title "phenomenology" signifi es varies somewhat with the discipline and tendency within the tradition and is itself a theme of refl ection rather like "philosophy" is for philosophers. Some essays here are historical, some are interpretive of classical work, and yet others are not on but in phenomenology and confront relatively new issues, such as communication between members of diff erent species. Readers will certainly fi nd unfamiliar names among the authors, in part because these others come from other disciplines and nations, but also because many younger colleagues are included. And over a quarter of the contributors are women. Email addresses of authors are included with their essays so that they can be contacted by colleagues when there appear to be common interests.
Besides this shared Preface, each volume in this work has its own Introduction by its editors and then Notes on Authors, a Chronicle about each region's phenomenological organizations, and the Tables of Contents of all fi ve volumes are appended to each volume. Th ere are no indices because names and words are easily searched electronically on pdf fi les. Abstracts in English are included and most essays are in English, but not a few essays are in other languages. (Phenomenology began of course in German, but soon also began to be written in French, Japanese, and Russian before World War I and is now expressed in possibly forty languages, a "multilinguality" certain to continue not only in teaching and research but also as insights and inspirations are gained from the study of more and more of the pasts of humanity.)
Th e same photograph of most of the colleagues at the Lima meeting immediately follows this Preface in all fi ve volumes (some were away visiting the Inca archaeological sites). Th ere is an additional photograph of some colleagues from its particular area somewhere in the midst of each volume and the volume for Latin America has a third photograph of Jacques Taminiaux, who gave the keynote address, together with Rosemary Rizo-Patron, who hosted O.P.O. II in Lima, and her husband Solomon.
Finally, while the contents of each volume have been developed by the various pairs of editors, the whole of this fi ve-volume publication has been assembled by Lester Embree with the able assistance of Daniel Marcelle.
Th e Editors

Introduction
In seeking to gain an overview of the Asian contributions to Phenomenology 2005, two distinctions have proven useful: "Western/intercultural" and "pure theory/applied theory." Th e fi rst one is concerned either with (1) the purely "Western style" problems or with (2) the intercultural issues. Th e second one is concerned with either (1) philosophical phenomenology or (2) disciplines beyond philosophy, such as, sociology, psychiatry, and photography. Overlapping them, we see four categories occur as a result:
A D. intercultural and applied I will fi rstly comment on these essays according to these four compound categories. After that, some refl ections will be off ered with special attention to the intercultural aspect in relation to the PEACE (Phenomenology East Asian CirclE) Mission Statement of CHO Kah Kyung and to the intercultural philosophy of F. M. WIMMER.
I. Description of these articles
A. Western and Philosophical
In "Husserl and Kant on Intuition," CHO Kah Kyung the author compares the concepts of intuition held by Husserl and Kant. In contrast to Bergson, both Husserl and Kant speak for the compatibility of intuition and intellect, but the author also shows how intuition for Kant is related to sensibility and for Husserl it is connected with essence and the emptiness or fulfi llment of concept. A deeper analysis is also made concerning the common ground of the two, for example, the intuitive experience as well as analogy used both in Husserl and Kant which extends to the etymological problem.
In "Ich, Leben und Trieb: Das Problem des Ich und des Bewusstseinsstroms bei Husserl," INAGAKI Satoshi aims to unfold the problematic of "I" in Husserl's phenomenology. Acknowledging the possibility of misunderstanding Husserl, who posits the concept of transcendental ego as the ultimate source of constitution, Inagaki hopes to do away with such mischief by bringing up the analysis of the manifold levels of the "I," ranging from the transcendental consciousness through the stream of consciousness to the "life of drives" (Triebleben), the last of which is closely connected with passive synthesis.
In "Natural Ethics: Legitimate Naturalism in Ethics" HOLENSTEIN Elmar questions the legitimacy of the anti-naturalistic position in ethics and proposes a model that involves natural dispositions towards such things as happiness and utility. He fi rst confi rms that it is possible to infer from "is" to "ought" when ability and evaluation are taken into account. He then proceeds to show that it belongs to human right to use one's natural ability. In the end he suspects the foundation of morality on its own ground, taking Kantian moral theory as example. In his attempt to go beyond the limitation of ethical thought in the modern age, he recognizes "the naturalistic properties as ethical properties," even though these naturalistic properties are insuffi cient to justify ethical judgment.
In "Heidegger's Da and Hegel's Diese: A Destructive Reading of Hegel's 'Sense Certainty,'" KE Xiaogang follows the path of the Heideggerian phenomenological-hermeneutical analysis of Hegel's Introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit to take up the problem of experience as well as sense certainty, with special attention to the terms such as "Da" as well as "Diese."
In "Living in the Risk World: Ulrich Beck in the Shadow of Husserl and Heidegger," KIM Hongwoo discusses the "risk discourse" of Ulrich Beck that is based on the thesis that human beings are unprepared to live in the world. At the end he brings up the crisis discourse of Husserl and Dasein-analysis to cope with this risk discourse.
In "From Intimacy to Familiarity: on the Political Constitution of the Life-World," KIMURA Masato aims to make clear the political constitution of the life-world against the background of the debate between Schutz and Voegelin. He argues that in the familiar surrounding of the daily lifeworld the political implication is already obvious due to the normative evaluation of one's own lifeworld setting.
In "Grundwort 'Gerechtigkeit': Heideggers NietzscheInterpretation," KODAMA Hakaru inquires into the meaning of justice in Nietzsche, which Heidegger takes up as one of the fi ve key concepts in his interpretation of that fi gure. Kodama regrets that this concept has been more or less neglected among Nietzsche interpreters. Acknowledging the signifi cance of justice as "the sincerity for oneself " as well as "true knowing," the author deals with Heidegger's understanding of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician.
In "Non-Familiarity and Otherness: Derrida's Hermeneutics of Friendship and its Political Implications," LAU Kwok-ying clarifi es the notion of friendship in Derrida. In distinction from brotherhood, friendship signifi es a kind of interpersonal relationship not at all based on kinship. It denotes openness to the unpredictability of encountering strangers of whatever kind. Th e political dimension in international relationships is also explored due to the fruitfulness of this concept.
In "Husserl's view of Metaphysics: Th e Role of Genuine Metaphysics in Phenomenological Philosophy," LEE Nam-in studies the problem of whether Husserl's phenomenology can be viewed as metaphysics. In line with the positions of Landgrebe, Kern, and Zahavi, he interprets Husserl's thought as begetting metaphysical implications by distinguishing the "genuine" metaphysics from the traditional, the former being founded on the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl.
In "From Miscarried Phenomenology to Intuitive Ontology: Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Bergson," MATSUBA Shoichi examines Merleau-Ponty's critique as well as appreciation of Bergson, emphasizing that he maintained an ambivalence toward Bergson. In the early period, Merleau-Ponty evaluates Bergson's ideas of per-ception and body in the framework of phenomenology, in which Bergson fails to recognizes the intentionality of consciousness and commits naturalism. In his middle period, Merleau-Ponty focuses on Bergson's theory of history and language and in the late period on intuition. Even though the author emphatically says that Merleau-Ponty's attitude toward Bergson never changes dramatically from positive to negative or vice versa, he hopes for a revival of Neo-Bergsonism based on the concept of intuition, which is crucial for the ontology in Merleau-Ponty's late period.
In "Th e Sublime of Judgment: Kant's Aesthetics in Deconstruction," MIYAZAKI Yusuke analyses the Kantian concept of the sublime with reference to the idea of deconstruction in Derrida as well as to contemporary French philosophy. Th e point of departure is the so-called aporetic structure of judgment: any judgment must be made simultaneously following a law and without following any law. Th e author traces this problematic back to Kant with emphasis on the notion of the sublime.
In "Habitualität und Zeitlichkeit," MURATA Norio treats habituality along two dimensions: temporality and activity. Compared to event or fact, habituality has longer duration and has great impact on the subject. It is acquired as time goes by. For this reason, is habituality is not timeless like the ideal concept. Habituality is on the other hand based on repeated activity, such that it is not equivalent to an inherent ability. Th e author puts forth the concept of instinct to indicate that the habituality is ultimately grounded on instinct, which is understood by Husserl as pure impulse.
In "Retrait à traduire (vers une confrontation entre Heidegger et Derrida),"
NISHIYAMA Tatsuya discusses whether the French word "retrait" is capable of being translated. Th e problem concerns the different ideas of translation between Derrida and Heidegger. Putting forth the strategy of re-translating and counter-translating upheld by Derrida, the author talks about the movement of the "trait" itself, which "opens up a space for the general transformability in language and in the history of metaphysics."
In "Der junge Heidegger und das Problem der Kategorie," WATANABE Kozinori aims to make clear that Heidegger's conception of category not only stems from his discussion of Aristotle's teaching, but is also under the infl uence of Dilthey's Lebenskategorie. For Watanabe the question of category is as signifi cant as the question of Being (Seinsfrage) in Heidegger's thought. According to the author's interpretation of category, a two-sided movement between language and world is unfolded insofar as the category indicates that not only the world is spoken by us but also speaks to us. Th e author thus sees a parallel between category and Being in Heidegger's philosophy.
In "On Schutz's Way of Doing Phenomenology: Th e Phenomenological Psychology of Husserl as a Clue," YU Chung-Chi inquires into the problem as to how Schutz can be understood as a phenomenologist. He suggests that the connection between Schutz and Husserl can be worked out in the framework of phenomenological psychology in Husserl and the question answered accordingly.
B. Western and Applied
In "Phenomenology and Photography: On Seeing Photographs and Photographic Seeing," CHEUNG Chan-Fai explores the nature of photographic seeing by way of phenomenological refl ection, with the aim to sketch out the ontological status of photography.
In "Th e Social Formation of Psychic Systems," HUANG ShinnYoung inquires into the relationship between the realm of the psychic and that of the social. Based on the social theory of Luhmann he suspects that the psychic system can be established on its own without referring to other systems, especially the social system. In "Th e Social Structure as Otherness," LUI Ping-keung tells the diff erence between the social structure defi ned by the actor himself and that defi ned by other actors. It is the second meaning of social structure that the author ventures to work out thoroughly.
C. Intercultural and Philosophical
In "只要是人，就会有对Being的理解？-对海德格尔说 法的质疑," JIN Xiping asks whether the Heideggerian questioning of being is universal and occurs in all cultures. If it is nothing but the result of European language, it can be hardly treated as universal at all. Or else, the questioning of being is inherent in all cultures despite the absence of the copula of being? Th e author tends to favor the fi rst position.
In "Ki und Du: Versuch einer Interkulturellen Phänomenologie," YAMAGUCHI Ichiro takes up the issue of intercultural philosophy: how can the philosophical positions from diff erent cultures be brought together to make a meaningful dialogue? He sees the possibility in the epochē of Husserl's phenomenology and meditation in Zen Buddhism. Both of them seek to undermine the traditional dualism, which is revealed most obviously in the mind-body dichotomy.
D. Intercultural and Applied
In "Sauntering through Hiroshima," HIDEO Hama describes the mood and thought aroused by the destroyed sight of Hiroshima. He also discusses the problem of nationalism as well as its opposite.
In "Th e Over-dominance of English in Global Education: Th e Contemporary Relevance of Leibniz's Notion of 'Language Care,'" KWAN Tze-wan is concerned with the phenomenon of over-dominance of English in the age of globalization. To save people from the estrangement of their own cultures, he pleads care for the respective mother tongue.
In "Th e Geophilosophy of WATSUIJI Tetsuro and Cultural Plurality," LEE Sung-Tae aims to illuminate the concepts of Fudo and Nin-Gen as well as Ie in the framework of WATSUIJI in order to discuss the problem of globalization and cultural plurality. Th e author holds that these Japanese concepts cast light on the current debate on ethnicity, nationality, and ethics.
In "Contacting and Enacting 'Self for being Ethical': A Model for Psychotherapy in Taiwan," LEE Wei-Lun is concerned with the ethical dimension of dealing with patients suff ering from mental problems. Th e cultural diff erence is taken into account concerning the practice of psychotherapy. Th e author is aware of the contrast between professional knowledge that originates from the West and the indigenous practice of psychotherapy.
In "Phenomenological Psychology in Taiwan: A Genealogical Approach," TSAI Cheng-yun describes, on the one hand, the results of the researches in the fi eld of phenomenological psychology in Taiwan, and, on the other hand, demonstrates how the so-called "genealogical phenomenology" can proceed on the basis of these researches in order to show a style of phenomenology diff erent from the West.
In "Art as a Way of the Recovery from Technē to Ethos: Phenomenological Approach to Indigenous Mental Healing in Taiwan," WANG Wen-Shen discusses how technē can be trans-formed to ethos by way of art within the framework of Husserl's as well as Heidegger's philosophy. He also tested the validity of his research in a medical institution in northern Taiwan and with a satisfactory result.
II. Refl ection
After the fi rst PEACE (Phenomenology East Asia CirclE) meeting, held in Hong Kong 2004, the Korean-American phenomenologist CHO Kah-Kyung says in "the PEACE mission statement," (http://utcp.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/peace/mission.html) that "…it is a propitious time for Asian scholars to rethink their hitherto onesided reception of phenomenology. Symbolically, a bridge is a meeting point of two-way traffi c. More than ever, we were nudged to set our sight on productive East-West intellectual conversation." In order to realize the mission of PEACE, he suggests four issues for the ongoing discussions:
1. Methodology: "Justify and demonstrate that phenomenology as method is uniquely cohesive to the self-expressive potential of traditional Asian thought." 2. East-West Intercultural Dialogue: "Drawing from the resources of phenomenological investigations on intersubjectivity, other person, alien world and pluralistic traditions, the PEACE proposes to develop ongoing productive East-West intercultural dialogues based on the mutual respect of the principle of alterity." 3. Inter-Asian Cooperation: "A further inter-Asian cooperation bringing each distinct type of thought in the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean traditions to a lively contrast."
4. Universal Reason and Unity of the World: "Th e PEACE renews its fi rm commitment to the universal reason as the teleology of humanity in progress. In real terms, however, the transversality and multiversality of reason are the indispensable pathways to the ideal unity of reason."
Th is mission statement and related suggestions disclose clearly what a phenomenologist of East Asian background has in mind in the phenomenological tradition of global scale. Undoubtedly, the phenomenologists in and from East Asia have made remarkable contributions to the development in phenomenology. Th ey have worked hard to get the major works translated to their own languages, they have made interpretations of them, introduced phenomenology into their culture, and some of them have become well known in the West as well with publications in Western languages. Our collection this time helps to reveal this fact only modestly. What is worthy of attention is that besides the excellent interpretations to the major works in phenomenology, they show great interests in intercultural problems, and deal with phenomenology with accent on their own cultures.
As East Asian phenomenologists regard it, phenomenology is more than an academic school of thought that originates in the West. For this reason, besides performing the same tasks as their Western colleagues, they aim to work out more signifi cant results in relation to cultural issues. With this in mind, two diff erent ways are often encountered. "Using the phenomenology as a method to interpret and dig out traditional thought" is one and "considering the phenomenological problems from the East Asian angle" is the other. Both of these possibilities concern intercultural dialogues, but the fi rst way seems to confi rm fi rst the universality of the phenomenological method and then to apply this method to the specifi c area of research. Th e second way concentrates on the core issues of phenomenology and remains sensitive to cultural diff erences. Focusing on the diff erence in respect of language or thought, they reexamine the issues in phenomenology from their own perspective.
For example, the colleague from Peking University, JIN Xiping, raises the question in his contribution to our collection of whether the questioning of Being is indeed universal. By posing this question, he is not presupposing in advance the universality of such a question, nor is he denying its universal validity. Instead, he refl ects on this question, assumed by Heidegger to be universal. With his culture as background, he brings it into discussion. Doing so, he asks whether the question raised by Heidegger can be echoed in his own culture. Th is case exemplifi es how one can rethink all the questions in phenomenology (such as "essence," "thing," "nature," "body," "ego," "intersubjectivity," and "social relationship") on one's own cultural basis. Agreeing with or disagreeing with what the great masters in the phenomenological tradition say is out of the question. What is at stake is that people start from their own culture and confront the issues in phenomenology and make clear their own perspectives accordingly.
As a result, in line with Cho in his mission statement of PEACE, "universal reason" and "the one world" should be viewed as "the teleology of humanity in progress," i.e., as ideas that have to be pursued via cultural multiplicity rather than treated as presuppositions or accepted as unquestioned truths. Based on this principle, the scholars from East Asia may work out a kind of phenomenology that is undoubtedly their own. If this is realized, East Asian Phenomenology would no longer be "Phenomenological Essays from East Asia," but would be genuine "East Asian Phenomenology."
III. Further Refl ection
In order to clarify the points mentioned above, further attention may be drawn to some viewpoints upheld by philosophers who have been concerned with intercultural issues in the last decade. Let me bring up, for example, some insights of Franz W. Wimmer of Vienna. He points out in his article, "Is Intercultural Philosophy a New Branch or a New Orientation in Philosophy?" (http://homepage.univie.ac.at/franz.martin.wimmer/fwpublen.html), that the philosophers from the non-Western countries face a dilemma: either they behave like Western colleagues, or they behave indigenously. In the fi rst case they are treated seriously, but not considered representative of their own culture. In the second case, though viewed as representative of their cultures, they are not taken seriously in the sense that their enterprise is not considered philosophical enough.
Th e implicit idea that constitutes this dilemma is that philosophy here is equivalent to occidental philosophy. Th is thought has been seldom challenged not only among professional philosophers in the West, but also, he contends, it has been accepted without question in Africa, Japan, and Latin America. As Wimmer indicates, when people talk about philosophy, particularly contemporary philosophy, only names from the West are taken into account.
How has such a situation come about? Why is the history of philosophy written in this way? Why are the non-Western elements excluded from the core of philosophy and treated as "alien," "pagan," or "barbarian?" Wimmer asks whether philosophy should not refl ect on itself so that all diff erent "philosophies" have equal status and dialogue with each other? He knows that this is no easy task. He suggests that one should at least not allow books from Indian Philosophy to be categorized as part of "Indology." Th at is to say, the philosophy in India should not be understood as just an instrument for the West to conceptualize what the "Indian soul" looks like.
According to Wimmer, philosophy itself has to cope with its own paradox: If philosophical thinking has to be done only in a certain language and language is unavoidably connected with culture, then no philosophy is free from its cultural background. In spite of this fact, almost all philosophers pursue universal truth, searching for claims that are valid for all people and all times.
Briefl y, this is the paradox: how can universal truth be revealed in a particular language?
Two typical solutions to this paradox are suggested in traditional philosophy: Hegel and Heidegger claim that the German language is the perfect language for philosophy. Th is is an ethnocentric position that no one will take seriously today. Th e second one is the way through strict method. Both Descartes and Husserl share this opinion. But this way is very much criticized today. Nowadays we see many people hold a third alternative: the so-called Ethnophilosophy. Th is position takes the popular thought in myths and sayings seriously. Th e typical Ethnophilosophy is the négritude movement in Africa, supported by Senghor, the former president of Senegal. Wimmer questions the validity of this alternative as a way out of the paradox, asking, ironically, if we can accept that the tales collected by Grim brothers during the heyday of Romanticism in the early 19 th century are useful to refute the moral philosophy of Kant. If so, then we may well accept the Ethnophilosophical idea. But how can one proceed seriously in philosophy? As Wimmer regards it, philosophy has to be argumentative. If a philosopher wants to claim that his thesis is universally valid, he cannot but use argument. And the reason why a true proposition is diff erent from a false one has to be based on certain criteria.
By the way, Wimmer sees another weakness in Ethnophilosophy, which is highly welcomed in this postmodern age, namely relativism. If we hold fi rmly to this relativism, then we give up the original spirit of philosophy: the search for universally valid truth. Th e last defi ciency of Ethnophilosophy lies in its self-contradictory position against Western philosophy. Th ose who speak for Ethnophilosophy on the one hand criticize sharply the self-centeredness of occidental philosophy, yet on the other hand they in general hold that the concepts from the West are helpful to illuminate their own traditional ideas.
All in all, Wimmer cannot agree with Ethnophilosophy. It cannot be a good solution to the paradox mentioned above. He is highly concerned with the original spirit of philosophy, the selfunderstanding of philosophy as well as the spirit of the European Enlightenment, even though he strongly believes that the ideal of this spirit can be fulfi lled only through culture and language. But he is also opposed to the idea that we should look for the answer back in history. Instead, we should look forward to the future, and the proper way is no other than that through interculturality, particularly through "polylogue," an expression coined by Wimmer. In this way, on the one hand, we pay enough attention to cultural multiplicity and, on the other hand, we avoid the errors resulting from relativism.
Philosophy used to be treated only as occidental philosophy. No matter how people have been accustomed to that thought, it needs to be overcome, so that we can cope with the contemporary as well as the future situation of all humankind. Th is situation allows for no "centric" philosophy of any kind. According to Wimmer, "Th is will be a continuation of the project of European enlightenment with diff erent means: not by relying on a unique method of science, but by creating a polylogue of traditions." (p. 12) And to realize this goal, some steps are required. First step: reconstruct diff erent traditions of thought in a comprehensive and diff erentiated way. Second step: consider the preconditions and limitations, as well as expectable results of such a polylogue.
All in all, the basic philosophical problems need to be reconsidered on this basis. For example, the sources of knowledge, the West used to consider two, but in India it has been claimed that they are six. How can we judge which is true? In addition, the issue of the human nature also has to be discussed. Th e aim is to reach the commonly agreeable ideas, and these ideas are "linguis-tically and culturally mixed." Only by this way will we be able to approach true universality. Today only the interculturally-oriented philosophy can help fulfi ll the old dream of philosophers of transculturally valid claims. Even if we fi nd it very diffi cult to reach this goal, we may at least follow the fi rst modest rule: "Never accept a philosophical thesis from authors of a single cultural tradition to be well founded. " We see how Wimmer's ideas are similar to the PEACE mission statement written by Cho. Th ey both oppose one-sidedness in contemporary philosophy and hope for an intercultural dialogue and for reaching the idea of universal value through such dialogue.
Of course, Wimmer has missed one point. As indicated earlier, he told us that the non-Western scholars encounter a dilemma: either they behave themselves like the Western colleagues, or they behave themselves indigenously. I fi nd this dilemma untenable if we consider that the non-Western scholars are beyond this dilemma when they have good knowledge about the occidental philosophy.
How can we say that a Chinese scholar who is expert in Kant, Hegel, or Heidegger ceases to be Chinese? Does a Western scholar who is expert on Buddhism cease to be Western? A Chinese of today is no longer the Chinese of thousand years ago. Even the Chinese scholar who studies Taoism is a "modern" Chinese. How indigenous can he be is as questionable as how he can interpret the classical texts of Taoism in the purely traditional way without referring to any "Western" notions. A modern Chinese can no longer choose between the "indigenous" and "modern" (automatically interpreted as "Western" in the eyes of many Chinese people). Instead he has to struggle to put the two essential elements together. Th is situation holds true, so I believe, for the whole East Asian world.
Back to our context, as far as phenomenology is concerned, when we see that phenomenologists in East Asia are learning, interpreting, and spreading this approach, they are cultivating, on the one hand, their own culture and, on the other hand, contributing to the century-old tradition. Th at is to say, they are not just doing what their colleagues in the occident are doing, rather, they are proceeding creatively for the benefi t of their own culture as well as for the general phenomenological movement.
Th e dilemma mentioned by Wimmer does not exist, when phenomenology in East Asia is not just phenomenological research in the Western style, but the Eastern Asian phenomenology (more specifi cally, Chinese phenomenology, Japanese phenomenology, Korean phenomenology, Taiwan phenomenology, Hong Kong phenomenology) in genuine ways. I truthfully believe that this can happen just like the Chinese Buddhism and its spread to Korea and Japan led to specifi c characteristics. In this case, how should the contributions of the Asian phenomenologists be evaluated? And what specifi c role do they play? Although this question can be answered only very vaguely now, it will become clear if this is carried out, even with only partial realization.
If East Asian researchers are prepared in this way, then they are ready enough to take part in the honorable forum of "polylogue." Without this preparation, the dialogue can be hardly conducted in a signifi cant way, because the occidental actors retain their major role on the stage, probably continuing their monologue as usual. Our collection this time shows the fact that many of the East Asian phenomenologists are highly interested in intercultural dialogue. In this way they are more than ready to join the many-sided dialogue.
